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ABSTRACT
Introducing Faceted Exception Handling for Dynamic Information Flow
by Sri Tej Narala

JavaScript is most commonly used as a part of web browsers, especially clientside scripts interacting with the user. JavaScript is also the source of many security
problems, which includes cross-site scripting attacks. The primary challenge is that
code from untrusted sources run with full privileges on the client side, thus leading to security breaches. This paper develops information flow controls with proper
exception handling to prevent violations of data confidentiality and integrity.
Faceted values are a mechanism to handle dynamic information flow security in a
way that overcomes the limitations caused by dynamic execution, but previous work
has not shown how to properly handle exceptions with faceted values. Sometimes
there might be problems where high-security information can be inferred from a program's control flow, or sometime the execution might crash while transferring this
high-security information when there is an exception raised. Usage of faceted values
is an experimental approach as an alternative to multi-process execution. This paper
provides more detail on providing exception support to multi-faceted execution.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

JavaScript has become the most common web development language. Though
once seen as a client side scripting language that only interacts with the user to
control visual layout, today JavaScript is widely used to communicate asynchronously
by sending and receiving data to and from the server thus giving web applications a
much more interactive look.
Developers generally build or develop websites by grabbing JavaScript codesnippets from various sources. This integration might be an intentional one or might
be a result of some malicious code being inserted due to some security vulnerability.
This act of injecting code from different untrusted zones into a website is generally
referred to as cross-site scripting attack (XSS). There are chances that this code might
still breach several security policies no matter if it has been included either knowingly or unknowingly. This malicious code operates with the same rights as that of
the normal code developed and written by the web developer, thus leading to different
security issues.
In this paper I worked on addressing one of such security issue which might leak
some information to the attacker due to an unexpected error in the program’s control
flow.
1.1

Security Challenges
There are a wide variety of security measures that have been implemented to

safeguard against these problems. As the content is changing and is very dynamic in
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nature it has become very challenging to keep up with the best practices. One way
is to build these security controls into the browser.
One way to tackle such security issues is to include proper information flow
analysis within the browser. Advantages of this approach being that the users are
protected even when they visit websites with no server side security. Though this
guarantees a systematic solution against proven security attacks, it has failed to
achieve its purpose in many of the cases as they only concentrate on static information
flow type systems. Here lies the challenge as JavaScript is dynamically typed, only
dynamic information flow analysis is well suited to achieve protection against these
malicious scripts.
1.2

Dynamic Information Flow
JavaScript is a dynamically typed language. It is used to embed within web

pages and is executed by the browser. It is now-a-days the most widely used programming language of all the current web 2.0 applications [14]. It is generally used
for client side validations, password fields check, major websites like search engines
and mapping applications. JavaScript code from multiple sources executes with the
same authority as that of an authorized user. To help address these sorts security
issues, we investigate the methodology of tracking the data/information flow dynamically during runtime. There has been some amount of work done prior to this on
type systems [15], [17], but most of them are not suitable to this kind of dynamic
languages. Further, having just a static analysis approach can be problematic when
used with in the browser.
Different ideas on dynamic information flow analysis has been published in previous papers [1], [3], [4] where the main discussion was around a special type of value
2

called faceted value. Faceted value approach was seen as one of the good way of achieving multi-process execution with the efficiency of single-process execution [19] [18] .
By altering each one of the faceted values that contains both high level(confidential)
and low level(public) information, a single process simulates the two processes of
multi-process execution. The main advantage here being able to execute single execution that is the two mimicked executions collapses to a single one if both the values
in a given faceted value are same and thus lessening the program overhead. More on
faceted values can be see in the following chapters.
There has been a couple of papers on faceted value approach [7] [4] to dynamic
information flow analysis. This paper concentrates on properly handling exceptions
with faceted approach. Chapter 2 describes some background information on types of
information flow analysis and also shows some of the JavaScript attacks. Chapter 3
gives an introduction on basic faceted evaluation, its semantics followed by some of the
scenarios where there is a need to handle exceptions and a theoretical explanation
of handling exceptions using the language constructs defined in earlier paper [7].
Chapter 4 and 5 takes you through the implementation part of the project with some
of the examples from real time scenarios and how the new feature has been embedded
into Mozilla Firefox browser. Chapter 6 compares the performance of faceted value
implementation to that of Secure-Multi execution and chapter 7 gives the conclusion.

3

CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1

Information Flow Analysis for JavaScript
Information flow generally refers to the transfer of information from one variable

x to the another variable y in a certain process. This chapter expands more on how
to track information flow. Information flow control secures information mainly by
limiting how exactly the information is communicated among the objects and users
with various security classes. The main approach that is followed to keep track of this
information flow is to label and track sensitive information. We associate each value
within this JavaScript interpreter with a security label. These labels are the security
classes dictating how a value may be used.
These dynamic labels are needed to securely control information flow, especially
when the access rights are changed dynamically and checked at runtime. Using these
labels, the interpreter should never leak any secret to public users.
2.1.1

Explicit Flows

Some times direct assignment leads to explicit flows as in here, as the value
var l = h;

depends on the value of h, the system monitor labels l as secret as well.
This system updates the labels based on the labels of those values that influence
the final result. For an addition operation the label of the result is decided by the
join of other operand’s labels. modifying an object’s structure or that of an array
4

by introducing or removing properties updates the label of that particular object to
current context. Such changes can be observed by an attacker easily.
2.1.2

Implicit Flows

Implicit flows arise through the program’s control flow. Given such a situation as
var l = 0;
if (h)
l = 1;

above, the value of l depends on the value of h. Thus to handle such kind of implicit
flows a new security label associated with the control flow has been introduced and is
called the program counter (pc). The pc reflects the securing against the modification
of less confidential data when the execution is influenced by confidential data.
Many previous papers on information flow control have only talked about languages without unstructured control flow. But many of the languages do have control
statements such as break, continue, try ... catch ... finally. The implicit flows that
come up with such kind of control flows are never to be ignored. In this paper I have
worked on presenting an experimental way to deal with such kind of implicit flows.
Concentrating on dynamic mechanisms alone will not be helpful as they acquire
excessive run-time overhead and might not prevent implicit flows that arising from
the control flow paths that are not taken or observed during runtime. Thus, both
dynamic labels and static information flow controls are combined to get the desired
security.
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2.1.3
2.1.3.1

Other existing information flow analysis
Secure Multi execution

Secure multi execution (SME) is a classic way to provide security by completing/running a program multiple times, once for every security level. It ensures for
every executing level, the output produced is confined only to that security level and
is dependent only on the input given to that level. Secure multiexecution guarantees
non-interference [18] [21].
Static analysis accepts or rejects a particular program before it is run and there is
no check performed once the program is started. In contrast to this, dynamic analysis
makes some checks at runtime. Dynamic analysis seems more permissive, but on the
other hand it will treat the paths/views that are not considered during the current
execution in a more moderate way and might limits any change [21].
Within secure multi-execution, security is achieved by separating the computations that are having different security principles. The program is executed as many
times as there are number of security levels within the program and different outputs
are seen in a different way for obvious reasons.
Consider the following JavaScript code used to send an email.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

var text = document.getElementById(’email-input’).text;
var abc = 0;
if(text.indexOf(’abc’)!=-1) {
abc = 1
};
var url = ’http://example.com/img.jpg?t=’ + escape(text) + abc;
document.getElementById(’banner-img’).src = url;

Figure 1
The expression "document.getElementById(’email-input’).text" could be con6

sidered as an input at security level H (confidential).

The expression

"document.getElementById(’banner-img’).src" could be considered as an output at
security level L (public). The example in Figure 1 displays an information flow from
a high level input(H) into a low level output (L). In this classification, this unacceptable flow can be eliminated by a property called non-interference.
2.1.3.2

Non-Interference

The goal here is to avert attackers from gaining access to any kind of information
that is confidential. In other words, if a program has same level of inputs, lets say
public, for two parallel executions, then it must produce the same level of outputs no
matter how confidential the inputs are.
A system is said to have non-interference property if and only if there is no
dependency on the high level input and it produces the same low level outputs for
any corresponding low level inputs. That is, a low level user will never be able to
gain any information on the activities of a high level user. Non-interference has two
different types.
1) Termination-sensitive
2) Termination-insensitive
Termination-sensitive non-interference makes sure that no information is lost
due to termination behavior of the program. Termination-insensitive non-interference
(TINI) leaks only a single bit of information and that is due to the program’s termination behavior.
Now consider the following program with different levels of execution.
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

var text = undefined;
var abc = 0;
if(text.indexOf(’abc’)!=-1) {
abc = 1
};
var url = ’http://example.com/img.jpg?t=’ + escape(text) + abc;
document.getElementById(’banner-img’).src = url;

Figure 2: Execution at L security level. Multi-Execution of JavaScript program from
Figure 1
1
2
3
4

var text = document.getElementById(’email-input’).text;
var abc = 0;
if(text.indexOf(’abc’)!=-1) { abc = 1 };
var url = ’http://example.com/img.jpg?t=’ + escape(text) + abc;

Figure 3: Execution at H security level. Multi-Execution of JavaScript program from
Figure 1
2.2

Faceted Evaluation Overview
We have seen the problems caused by implicit flows. To overcome that, the

Faceted Value approach has been put forward in the previous papers [4] [7]. Consider
the following example where the value of l depends on the authority of the observer.
var l = 0 ;
if (h)
l = 1;

if h is secret here, then
-a private observer who has access to h reads l as 1;
-a public observer who doesn’t have access to h reads it as 0;
Looking at this, A faceted value can be explained as a triple that consists of a principle
k and then followed by two values 𝑉𝐻 and 𝑉𝐿 . Faceted values showcase the dual nature
8

of l that has to be 0 or 1 based on the user's authority. Below is how a faceted value
can be written
< 𝑘 ? 𝑉𝐻 : 𝑉𝐿 >
A private observer can see 𝑉𝐻 and public observer can see 𝑉𝐿 . But if there is a need
to represent a single value V where it needs to be private, it can be showcased as
<𝑘?𝑉 : ⊥>
A faceted value can be nested. Consider the example below.
< 𝑘1 ? 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 : ⊥ > && < 𝑘2 ? 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 : ⊥ >
The above expression can be evaluated to
< 𝑘1 ? < 𝑘2 ? 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 : ⊥ > : ⊥ >
where 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are two different principals.
Using these Faceted Values, a previous paper [4] developed a dynamic analysis
that exactly tracks information flow. If a control flow comes across a faceted value
as shown in Figure 5, both 𝑒1 and 𝑒2 are executed carefully and whatever evaluations
or assignments that are performed during the 𝑒1 phase are only observed by private
users and those of 𝑒2 by public users. After both the evaluations are completed, the
results are combined into a single faceted value and the flow continues. We can have
a closer look at the examples in later chapters.
2.2.1

Exceptions Overview

Handling exceptions with faceted values introduces many challenges. An exception raised in a single view should not influence the other view especially when the
exception is raised in a higher level view. Intruders can have a chance to send out few
9

Figure 4: The source language 𝜆𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑡 .
Source: [7]
1
2
3
4

var k = <𝑘1 ? 0 : 1>;
if (k)
e1;
else e2;

Figure 5: Faceted evaluation - control flow.
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values that might raise an exception and thus try to get a handle on the actual information by repeatedly sending such kind if information. These implicit flows needs to
be properly handled. Consider the example Figure 6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

function parseJSON( jsonStr) {
var obj = {};
try {
eval (" obj = " + jsonStr);
} catch (e) {
console.log(e);
throw e;
}
return obj;
}

Figure 6: Faceted exception - control flow.
This function accepts a JSON string as an input and assigns it to an object obj. If
the given JSON string is malformed an exception is thrown at line 4.

if the parameter jsonStr that is sent to this function in Figure 6 is of this form,
< 𝑘 ? “{𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 : ‘𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡ℎ′ , 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 : 2543′′ : “{ }′′ >
then for a higher level view there will be a syntax error thrown. But we need to make
sure that does not affect what a lower level user can see and this exception should
not be visible in that view. In this paper, I will be presenting a proper way to handle
this kind of exception and make sure the control flow is proper and the program does
not crash.
The main theme about Faceted Evaluation is to mimic the multiple executions of
SME. Labelled approach in many situations, lacks certain important features. This
paper reviews the semantics of faceted values with exceptions for minimal language
𝜆𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑡 and provides implementation for JavaScript using Narcissus [9] and Zaphod [10]
libraries.
11

Figure 7: Reflected XSS.
Source: [29]
2.3

JavaScript Attacks
JavaScript and the Document Object Model are the main source of security

attacks. They provide a way for malicious users to inject third party scripts and
allowing them to run on the client computer via the webpage. A common security
problem related to JavaScript is cross-site scripting or XSS, which is a violation of
the same-origin policy.
The main goal of the attacker to implement XSS attack is to introduce the
malicious script into the webpage of the victim. This script appears to be from the
same site that is being attacked and thus user’s browser cannot identify the script
being executed is a part of the same site that the they are viewing [34]. This can be
achieved by submitting some special values through webforms. Figures 9, 10 shows
few examples of JavaScript attacks.
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Figure 8: Persistent XSS.
Source: [29]
1
2
3
4

<SCRIPT>
var output=document.URL.indexOf("parameter=")+10;
document.write(document.URL.substring(output,document.URL.length));
</SCRIPT>

Figure 9: Script to write on the screen from a url parameter. This can be used to
gain access to user’s session cookie by sending a url as shown in Figure 10
2.3.1

Different types of XSS attacks

Persistent XSS, malicious string is a part of website’s database. Figure 8
Reflected XSS, malicious string will be a part of the victim’s request. Figure 7
DOM-based XSS, vulnerability is seen within the client-side code. Figures 9, 10
shows DOM based attack.
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1

www.mysite.com/page.html?parameter=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>

Figure 10: URL used to attack.
2.3.2

Clickjacking

Advertising is the source of numerous incidents involving malicious JavaScript
code. Attacker tries to intercept any click that user clicks on the advertise and
makes the browser to redirect to thirdparty site by populating the URL to document.location [30]. Once, the user is redirected, then the site may install malware
1
2
3

document.addEventListener("click",new function() {
document.location = "http://www.evil.com";
});

Figure 11: URL used to attack.
onto the user’s system. Details on this attack are available on Google Caja’s website [31]
In order to prevent this kind of attack, we generally restrict write to document.location to all the scripts hosted on the trusted/current site. All other scripts
that are loaded from the other domains are marked as untrusted. DOM objects
are updated as untrusted facets for simple usage except the DOM objects like document.location, which is treated as high-integrity. Usage of faceted values helps us in
using the authorized/trusted facet if the URL is a faceted value. Thus by marking
the code from external sites as untrusted and limiting its ability to update critical
fields, we achieve key integrity properties.
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CHAPTER 3
Multi-Faceted Evaluation
The basic structure for faceted evaluation for dynamic information flow is as
shown in Figure 1. This language is an extension of 𝜆 -calculus with a special value
called ⊥ and facilities for creating faceted values. These semantics were developed as
a part of previous work [7]. This paper provides an implementation for the same in
JavaScript that was discussed in previous paper, further checks for different possibilities of attacks that can be avoided.
As shown in Figure 1, this language captures most of the essential features of
dynamic information flow in many realistic languages. The language includes few
of the key challenges like higher order function calls, implicit flows and mutable
references.
𝜆𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑡 contains the following standard features like variables (x), functions (𝜆𝑥.𝑒 ),
function application (𝑒1 , 𝑒2 ) and constants (c). This language also supports referencing (ref e) and dereferencing (!e) and updating (𝑒1 := 𝑒2 ) a reference cell. In order
to model the same interactive nature of JavaScript, our 𝜆𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑡 also supports reading
from and writing to files. The expression
< 𝑘 ? 𝑒1 : 𝑒2 >
is a faceted value, which says 𝑒1 is a value that can only be observed by the private
users. That is, if a user does not have access to the secret value, then he can only see
the public value 𝑒2 .
The ⊥ value that is shown in the language semantics above is a substitute for
"nothing" , similar to null in Java or undefined in JavaScript. It is generally used as
15

Figure 12: Standard Semantics.
Source: [7]
a public value with nothing to display as shown below. Where V denotes the private
value.
< 𝑘?𝑉 : ⊥>
Figure 12 shows the standard semantics without faceted values. Values may be
addresses, ⊥ , constants or closures as shown. The store 𝜎 maps addresses to values
and also files f to sequence of values w, each address is allocated to a reference cell a.

16

The standard semantics as shown in Figure 12 can be interpreted as an expression
e
′

𝜎, 𝑒 ↓ 𝜎 , 𝑣
′

in the context of store 𝜎 is evaluated, which results in a value v and the store 𝜎 . To
show one example, the rule [ s-app ] evaluates the function body e which is called;
the notation e[x := v] says that it maps x to v for all values within expression e.
One unusual thing that can be observed here is the value ⊥. Operations that
include this are very strict in nature. Strict operations with ⊥ clearly considers it as
no value. This is different from having "undefined". We can see more on this when
this is used as a part of faceted value
3.1

Programming Constructs with Facets
As the standard semantics are now defined, we now look into the extended se-

mantics with faceted values that track information flow dynamically and provide
non-interference guarantees.
Figure 13 shows the additional runtime syntax that is required to support faceted
values. Values "V" now contain faceted values of the form
< 𝑘 ? 𝑉𝐻 : 𝑉𝐿 >
where 𝑉𝐻 is private facet and 𝑉𝐿 is public. The value
< 𝑘 ? ”𝑃 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑” : ⊥ >
says that Password is confidential and can only seen by the user who has access to k.
NULL on the other side is viewed by unauthorized viewers.
A new label called the program counter(pc) is introduced to keep track of when
program is influenced by public or private facets.
17

Figure 13: Extended Semantics with faceted values.
Source: [7]
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Figure 14: The standard semantics to handle exceptions.
Source: [7]
3.2

Faceted Evaluation with Exceptions
In this paper I have concentrated on providing exception support for faceted

evaluation. If an exception is thrown due to a single facet of a faceted value, that
must not be visible to unauthorized principals. JavaScript supports exceptions to
smoothly handle errors. These exceptions introduce additional challenges to our
analysis on evaluation with faceted values, as some branches of a faceted execution
could terminate normally but others might throw exceptions.
Thus, there is a need to extend our analysis to handles such cases like throwing
and catching exceptions. We improve the syntax of 𝜆𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑡 as follows:
𝑒 ::= ... | 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑒 | 𝑒1 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑒2
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Figure 15: Core rules for Faceted Evaluation with Exception Handling.
Source: [7]
Figure 14 shows some of the additional rules for the standard semantics to handle
exceptions. Unlike the normal standard semantics, an evaluation returns a behaviour
(b), which can either be a value (v) or raise, marking an exception. We can describe
[s-try-catch] rule as in an expression 𝑒1 catch 𝑒2 , if 𝑒1 is evaluated to raise, then 𝑒2
is evaluated and the result is returned. Otherwise, 𝑒1 is evaluated and the result is
returned.
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Figure 16: Faceted Evaluation Rules for Application and Exceptions.
Source: [7]
3.3

Faceted Exceptions
We now move a step forward and work on core rules for faceted evaluation with

exceptions. Exception handling with faceted values requires considerable amount of
care. As shown in Figure 15, in an application (𝑒1 𝑒2 ), if 𝑒1 evaluates to raise for some
view of the faceted value, then 𝑒2 should not be evaluated for that view. Similarly, an
exception handling block should only be executed for views that witness an exception.
In previous paper by Austin and Flanagan [7], there are two additional evaluation
relations introduced to handle exceptions properly. The rules are further updated
and presented in Figure 16.
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An additional evaluation relation has been introduced in the paper by Austin
and Flanagan [7]
′

𝜎𝑒 ↓↓𝐵
𝑃𝐶 𝜎 𝐵

′

Here the evaluation of e is controlled by superscript B , so that this relation evaluates
e only for views L for which L(B) not= raise: as shown in Figure 16. This says that
e is evaluated normally if the observed behaviour B is a value, as mentioned by [fbnormal]. In other case, if B is raise, e is not evaluated and instead raise is returned
as mentioned by [fb-raise]. The rule [fb-split] says that its called recursively on every
facet when B is a faceted behaviour
An important property that has to be observed here is that if there is an exception
that is raised for a particular view, this view will not be affected by the code part
that has been skipped over due to an exception.
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CHAPTER 4
Implementation of faceted exceptions with JavaScript
Having seen some of the semantics to handle exceptions(Figure 15 and Figure
16) using faceted values, we now go ahead to see some of the code samples and
observations using the same. We have developed few of the code samples and executed
them from command line. consider the following code sample Figure 17
As seen in the line # 1, a variable p is assigned a value 0 by default. In line # 2,
a faceted value is created using the function "cloak". The function cloak is given with
two parameters, the first one being the value and the second one being the principle.
Principle states what kind of information this variable carries. Principle can assume
any value. Its basically a string or just a character that classifies the associated value.
For example, to classify a highly secured value/information we use "h", stating that
this value can only be viewed by authorized users. we can see the structure of cc as
mentioned below.
(𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 : {𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 : ”ℎ”, 𝑏𝑎𝑟 : (𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑 0)}, 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 : 123456, 𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 : 0)
The variable cc, which contains the faceted value, is checked for authorization and
an exception is thrown if some unauthorized value is observed. As described in the
earlier chapters, the "if" block is executed twice as per the multi-process execution
principles, once for the authorized view and once for the unauthorized view. The if
block sees the value of cc as "123456" for the authorized view and "0" for the another.
As per the code, when cc is "0" there is an exception being thrown and the program
counter p is being updated to 1. If there is normal flow in the program with out
any exception, the value of the program counter p will be seen as 2. Thus, there
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1
2
3

var p = 0;
var cc = cloak (123456,"h") || 0;
try {

4

if (cc===0)
{
throw "error";
}
p=2;

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

}
catch (e) {
p=1;
}
print(cc);
print(p);
...
...

Figure 17: Sample code that handles exceptions.
cc is a faceted value that stores confidential information like credit card details.
is no abrupt end in the program and the rest of the steps are well executed after
the exception normally. Just that the value of p will be differ. This multi-process
execution will only be initiated for the if block and then p is converted to a faceted
value and a single execution is continued there on until the program flow encounters
another conditional block or statement. The value of p can be seen as below.
(𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙 : {𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 : ”ℎ”, 𝑏𝑎𝑟 : 𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒}, 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 : 2, 𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 : 1)

4.1

Possible attack with Exceptions
Consider the code sample 18. For every bit set in the binary representation of a

Credit Card number, the code mentioned leaks a bit every time when there is no exception and this tracks all the bit positions that are set. This code crashes with previous
implementation of faceted values whenever there is an exception raised. setTimeout
initiates a new thread which calls the function leakBit for every 2 seconds. Function
24

1
2

var creditCard = cloak (5,"h") || 0;
setTimeout(function(){ leakBit(0); }, 2000);

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

var leakBit = function (bitPos) {
setTimeout(function(){
leakBit(bitPos+1);
}, 2000);
var bitSet = creditCard &
Math.pow(2,bitPos);
if(bitSet === 0) {
throw "error";
}
sendInfoToEvilServer(
"www.evil.com/hack.html?bitSet="+bitPos);
}

Figure 18: Information leak using exceptions.
leakBit does a 'bitwise and'(&) operation between the tracked number (Credit Card
number) and a number which is mentioned in the power of 2. Every time when the
function leakBit is called, the parameter is incremented and passed to it. This way
it is easy to track which bit of the confidential information is set and send it to the
evil server. For all the threads which see the bitSet variable as 1, the information is
sent to the evil server and all the threads which see the bitSet variable as 0 crashes
throwing an exception which is not tracked and thus no information is sent. As there
is no exception scenario handled properly for faceted execution, this code does not
restrict the intruder from gaining access to the confidential information.
Consider the code sample 19. Exceptions are properly handled and there is no
program crash. The information will still be sent the evil server for all the threads
which see the bitSet variable as either 0 or 1. But only the public information will be
sent every time. We mark the public information as "0" at line # 15 always and is
assigned as a public value. Thus the attacker only sees 0’s every time. This prevents
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1
2

var creditCard = cloak (5,"h") || 0;
setTimeout(function(){ leakBit(0); }, 2000);

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

var leakBit = function (bitPos) {
setTimeout(function(){
leakBit(bitPos+1);
}, 2000);
var bitSet = creditCard &
Math.pow(2,bitPos);
try{
if(bitSet === 0) {
throw "error";
}
}catch(e) {
bitSet=0;
}
sendInfoToEvilServer(
"www.evil.com/hack.html?bitSet="+bitPos);
}

Figure 19: Restricting Information leak.
the attacker to get hold of any confidential information.
4.2

Embedding the feature into Firefox
The ideas on faceted evaluation have been included into Firefox through the Nar-

cissus JavaScript engine [8] and Zaphod Firefox plugin [10] To handle the additional
complexities of JavaScript, ZaphodFacets implementation [11] extends the faceted semantics. This paper extends the basic implementation without exceptions that was
presented in [7] to provide exception handling support.
Among the examples given, I have modified the method call to "getView()" to
send the principle as a string variable and hence return the exact value for the view.
This plugin also handles exception scenarios as described above in the codes sample.
The function "cloak(v,k)" produces a faceted value with v being the authorized value
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and null being the unauthorized value. the unauthorized value can be changed by
performing a logical or operation between the faceted value and the desired value for
the view (unauthorized).
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥 = 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑘(”𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜”, ”ℎ”) || ”𝐻𝑖”;
The above statement sets x to
< 𝑘 ? ”𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜” : ”𝐻𝑖” >
Cloak is mainly used during an input given to the system.
Once Zaphod plugin is installed into the browser, we can choose to execute
JavaScript either using normal Spider Monkey library or by using Narcissus library.
We can see a button on the status bar to toggle between the two engines. Narcissus
library has the capacity to deal with faceted values and provide a smooth flow when
an exception occurs in any single view. The code that is evaluated on narcissus have
different permissions.
4.3

Identifying private data
The major challenge here lies in identifying the private data and if any excep-

tion is raised, how does the view needs to react as it should see no difference in the
functionality. Generally the policy published in the paper [7] describes that all the
password fields are private and also any form element with a class of secure or confidential is also treated as private data. I, in this paper will be going by the same
set of rules to identify private data and thus properly handle exceptions that arise
due to improper assignments within the control flow. Similarly we extend the same
techniques to identify the untrusted scripts.
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CHAPTER 5
Firefox addon development

An add-on is something that can be associated with an existing application or
object to improve its performance or to enhance security [22]. In software terms this
can be referred to as plug-in a browser extension, or an add-on. In general, addons are used to block web based ads, detect malware, download video content from
a web-page, use different themes, enables internet content to be downloaded and be
played on different web players like flash, quicktime and many a times supports online
games.
5.1

History
Microsoft’s Internet explorer was the first one to support these browser

extensions/add-ons starting from its version 5 in 1999 [35]. Later since 2004, [36]
Mozilla started providing support for extensions within its own browser Firefox. Then
followed by Opera, Chrome, and Safari browsers in 2009 and 2010 [37], [38], [39],. The
mode of development and the language used differs from browser to browser and thus
the extensions developed are not cross platform. All these extensions can be obtained
from the respective browser stores for Mozilla [23], for Chrome [24], for Safari [25].
5.2

Why Firefox ?
Firefox provides an extensive API base to develop add-ons. Add-ons for Firefox

are more powerful and have access to all of the process that a Firefox browser starts
or has access to. As this paper deals with security, it is much more easier from the
developer perspective with more stream lined API calls to add security features into
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a Firefox based add-on when compared to Chrome extensions. A Firefox add-on
can gain access to external resources in a much easier way as compared to Chrome
extensions. Chrome is limited in-terms of trusting an extension, thus complete access
is not given to a Chrome extension and hence limiting us to only few areas.
There are 3 different forms of Extensions that are in use now-a-days [27]
1) Add-ons SDK extensions (also known as Jetpacks)
2) Bootstrapped extensions
3) Traditional extensions
As a part of this paper, I worked on an existing traditional extension called Zaphod [10]. Traditional, classic, or XUL extensions are more powerful, but more complicated to build and require a restart to install [26]. Due to its power to access more
browser features, we chose this kind of development in contrast to boostrapped or
SDK based implementations.
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CHAPTER 6
Performance Results

To understand the trade offs between both secure multi-execution and faceted
values, I have compared performance tests between both sequential and concurrent
secure multi-execution in Narcissus to that of faceted execution.
6.1

System Configuration
All of my tests were performed on a Ubuntu 14.04 LTS system. The machine is

running with 1.60GHz Intel Corei5-4200U processor with 4 cores and 6 GB of memory.
6.2

Benchmarks
I have selected testcases from the SunSpider [28] benchmark suite.

6.3

Test Suits
• The crypto-md5 test case deals with number crunching. This was modified
to include 8 hashing operations with some inputs marked as confidential as per
previous paper [7]. Test cases involve 0 through 8 principals. Every principal marks an element as confidential for each case; additional hash inputs are
marked as public. For example, test 1 hashes 1 confidential input and 7 public
inputs. Test 8 hashes 8 confidential inputs and has no public inputs. if the data
is marked as confidential then the public facet is set to an empty string.
• The string-tagcloud test case deals with parsing JavaScript Object Notation (JSON). This test is modified to create 8 distinct tag clouds from JSON-
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formatted strings. As in crypto-md5 tests, inputs from 0 to 8 are marked as
confidential using a different principal. The public facet of this confidential data
is initialized to a JSON string that represents an empty array.
• The string-unpack-code test cases makes use of 4 JavaScript libraries
MochiKit, jQuery, Dojo, & Prototype and extracts JavaScript code from them.
This test case is modified to include 0-4 of the packed libraries and are marked
as untrusted, and except for the Dojo library 3 others are passed to eval. This
kind of setup might be useful for those that involves confidential information.
During this testing the public facet is left as undefined.

6.4

Results
The results that are shown in Table 1 showcase the trade-offs between different

approaches. The Sequential approach using Secure multi execution has better performance when there are no principals included. But once the number of principals
grow, the performance time is almost doubled for each principal.
Concurrent multi-execution is seen to be better performing when the number
of principals are small. As the number of principals increase, the performance time
is increased exponentially for concurrent execution. Faceted evaluation outperforms
both concurrent and sequential multi-execution as the number of principals increase.
There are some differences observed between string-tagcloud and crypto-md5
evaluations with faceted values. The performance timings are pretty constant and
decrease a bit for the string-tagcloud test. This is observed as it depends on the
choice of public facets, which sometimes tend to require lesser computations. For
example, parsing a JSON string with empty size is faster than parsing a huge JSON
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Time in seconds
Test case

# principals

crypto-md5

string-tagcloud

string-unpack-code

Exception
dling

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
1
2
3
4

0
1
2
3
Han- 4

Secure Multi-Execution
Sequential
Concurrent

182
186
332
211
619
380
1148
699
2414
1285
4116
2184
*
3982
*
*
*
*
82
84
153
141
287
180
536
325
993
578
1861
875
3270
1945
*
*
*
*
5.5
5.5
10
6.4
19.8
11.7
39.7
23.7
80
48.4
Time in milli seconds
64
67
93
104
161
222
295
449
576
773

5
1129
6
2192
7
4441
8
9540
Table 1: Faceted Evaluation vs.
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Faceted Execution

193
213
253
258
283
320
338
345
367
83
79
77
75
72
70
68
65
65
5.2
4.6
4.6
4.6
4.6
69
61
41
41
42

890
45
1375
42
2900
45
5770
49
Secure Multi-Execution

string cloud. For the other test case, crypto-md5, we can see faceted evaluation is
slowed down considerably with the introduction of each principal.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion

We have seen how to achieve termination-insensitive non-interference dynamically in scenarios involving exceptions. Faceted values calculate multiple different
views for different security levels while providing a non-interference guarantee. Adding
to the existing research on the faceted value approach from previous papers [4, 7] that
show-cased implementation of JavaScript with faceted values to defend against many
security related attacks , this paper shows an experimental implementation of exception handling scenarios without the program being halted abruptly and not leaking
any information to the attacker by throwing exceptions when any malicious code is
inserted.
Our performance results clearly show how the faceted value approach outperforms
Secure Multi-Execution in many cases, even when exception handling is involved and
thus showing a way for much secure JavaScript implementations.
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